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BOOK REVIEW
Dawn of the Intercontinental Sniper:
The Drone’s Cascading Contribution to the Modern Battlefield’s Complexity
PREDATOR: THE SECRET ORIGINS OF THE DRONE REVOLUTION. By Richard Whittle.
Henry Holt & Co., New York, 2014, pp 353. $30.00.
Reviewed by Steven L. Schooner * & Nathaniel E. Castellano **
This is the story of the first armed drone ever to be flown by
intercontinental remote control and used to kill human
beings on the other side of the globe. 1

INTRODUCTION
Rarely do mainstream publishers offer heavily researched, non-fiction case
studies involving national security, defense acquisition, and international law. Nor do
most books in these disciplines leave readers eagerly anticipating a forthcoming action
movie. 2 So kudos to author Richard Whittle for crafting a thrilling and highly informative
*

Steven L. Schooner (sschooner@law.gwu.edu) is the Nash & Cibinic Professor of
Government Procurement Law at the George Washington University Law School.
Professor Schooner gratefully acknowledges Seymour Herman for his continued support
of government procurement law research at the George Washington University Law
School.
** Nathaniel E. Castellano (necastellano@law.gwu.edu) is a graduate of the George
Washington University Law School, a Murray J. Schooner Government Procurement
Scholar, and a member of the George Washington Law Review. The authors thank Lillian
Bond, Julie Dickerson, John Fletcher, and James Whittle for their helpful suggestions and
insights on this topic.
1
RICHARD WHITTLE, PREDATOR: THE SECRET ORIGINS OF THE DRONE REVOLUTION 5–6
(2014).
2
It is difficult to avoid reference to popular culture when discussing a weapons
system that many believed was named after an action movie:
Neal Blue wanted to call his pet project the Birdie, because “birdies go
cheep, cheep, cheep.” Potential military and international customers, he
was sure, would get the pun and appreciate the point that this was going to
be a very inexpensive weapon. . . . Early one morning, [however, before a
test flight, Cassidy] walked to the tail and smoothed on a sticker bearing
the new appellation. Later, Cassidy and the Blue brothers would insist it
was pure coincidence that an Arnold Schwarzenegger movie set in Central
America and released within days of their first meeting . . . was also called
Predator.
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history of technological innovation, government contracting, and weapons system
development and deployment. This well-written and thought-provoking book offers
anecdotes for examination of a plethora of complex issues in national security and
international law. The military’s senior service schools and academies would be well
served to incorporate Predator into their reading lists. It is easy to imagine a semesterlong capstone seminar at the National Defense University (NDU) Eisenhower School 3
based solely on the cornucopia of issues raised in this book.
This review essay introduces prospective readers to a handful of the captivating
characters that propel the Predator saga; identifies some of the many interesting national
security and international law issues raised in Whittle’s book; offers a disturbing
anecdote about the extent to which the government’s post-millennial outsourcing has
eroded the government’s monopoly over the use of force; paints a pessimistic picture of
the Defense Acquisition System; and concludes that a broad range of sophisticated
readers will enjoy Whittle’s excellent new book, Predator.
I.

GREAT STORIES INVOLVE REMARKABLE PEOPLE

This is the drone revolution’s book of genesis, and like
another creation story it opens near the confluence of the
rivers Tigris and Euphrates. It begins with a boy in
Baghdad. 4
Readers familiar with his first book, The Dream Machine, already know that
Whittle believes effective storytelling depends upon animating compelling characters. 5
Three examples amply demonstrate this point. First, the lyrical quote above introduces
Abraham (Abe) Karem, a Baghdad-born Israeli engineer equipped with a unique
combination of skill, confidence, interest in a niche-to-nascent field, 6 and a fierce

Id. at 46.
3
“The Eisenhower School prepares selected military and civilians for strategic leadership
and success in developing our national security strategy and in evaluating . . . and
managing resources in the execution of that strategy.” THE EISENHOWER SCHOOL,
http://www.ndu.edu/Academics/CollegesCenters/TheEisenhowerSchool.aspx.
4
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 6.
5
RICHARD WHITTLE, THE DREAM MACHINE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NOTORIOUS V22 OSPREY (2010); see also Steven L. Schooner & Nathaniel E. Castellano, Review
Essay: Reading the Dream Machine: The Untold Story of the Notorious V-22 Osprey, by
Richard Whittle, in Light of the Defense Acquisition Performance Study, 43 PUB. CONT.
L. J. 391 (2014).
6
“[H]e believed himself not only the best engineer in aeronautics but probably the best
engineer of any kind in all of Israel . . . . [H]e had been a model aircraft hobbyist since his
teens, and . . . his specialty was a type of aircraft whose sole objective was endurance.”
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 15.
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independent—or anti-establishment—streak. 7 Karem’s early interest in model gliders and
his later inability to remain constrained by the bureaucracies of the Israeli Air Force and
Israel Aerospace Industries led to his emigration to the United States and paved the way
for the Predator’s evolution.
Similarly, the Blue brothers, 8 Linden and Neal, the eventual owners of the
company that builds the Predator, 9 lived lives made for entertaining biography. In
college, the brothers were featured on the cover of Life magazine for their exploits
piloting a four-seat, fabric-covered Piper aircraft through a forty-four stop, 110-day Latin
American expedition. 10 Remarkably, the brothers ultimately encountered the Nicaraguan
rebels’ efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas, an experience that convinced Neal Blue that
GPS-guided flying bombs might be a useful covert weapon. 11 Theirs is a remarkable tale
of kismet and moxie.
Finally, Whittle introduces Commander Kirk S. Lippold, who was serving as
captain of the USS Cole when, on October 12, 2000, Al Qaeda suicide bombers blew a
hole in the side of his ship, killing seventeen sailors. 12 Lippold first visited the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters at 6:30 a.m. on September 11, 2001. Shortly
after 7:00 a.m., Lippold bemoaned the public’s underestimation of Osama bin Laden: “I
believe it is going to take a seminal event, probably in this country, where hundreds, if
not thousands, are going to have to die before Americans realize we’re at war with this
guy.” 13 Not long after nine o’clock that morning, Lippold’s CIA host remarked: “Kirk, I
can’t believe you said what you did this morning . . . . I think the seminal event has just
7

“Karem believed that RPVs were one type of aircraft a lone inventor could still develop
in a garage . . . .” Id. at 19.
8
Not to be confused with the Blues Brothers of film and music fame.
9
Id. at 41–44. See generally Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Sensors, GENERAL
ATOMICS, http://www.ga.com/unmanned-aircraft-systems-and-sensors; Aircraft
Platforms, GENERAL ATOMICS, http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php.
10
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 33–34. See generally Di Freeze, Linden Blue:
From Disease-Resistant Bananas to UAVs, AIRPORT JOURNALS,
http://airportjournals.com/linden-blue-from-disease-resistant-bananas-to-uavs/; Yasha
Levine, The Billionaire Blue Brothers Behind America’s Predator Drones, OCCUPY.COM
(Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.occupy.com/article/billionaire-blue-brothers-behindamericas-predator-drones; Charles Duhigg, The Pilotless Plane that Only Looks Like
Child’s Play, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/business/yourmoney/15atomics.html?pagewanted=a
ll&_r=2&.
11
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 41.
12
Id. at 229. For maritime and technology geeks, the authors recommend viewing the
extraordinary time-lapse photography of the damaged USS Cole’s recovery at sea by the
Norwegian heavy transport ship M/V Blue Marlin. See Photo Archive of USS Cole
Recovery, PIANOLADYNANCY.COM,
http://www.pianoladynancy.com/recovery_usscole.htm.
13
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 229–30.
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happened.” 14 Yet again, Whittle’s writing exemplifies the adage: Truth is stranger than
fiction.

II.

TECHNOLOGICAL EVOLUTION AND DISAGGREGATION MAKES
FOR STRANGE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
[The Predator] enabled the U.S. government to hunt down
. . . enemies of the state by remote control. Critics see it
more darkly, as a weapon that the United States has
wielded to assassinate people without accountability. 15

For many readers, this book offers a case study in innovation, describing the
process through which creative people deployed both existing and rapidly evolving
technologies to permit intercontinental remote piloting, surveillance, and weapons
delivery. At the same time, Predator is accessible to readers intrigued by the proliferation
and diversification of drones. 16 Readers of this journal, however, may be more interested
in Whittle’s descriptions of the legal dilemmas that surrounded firing a missile at
personnel threats on foreign soil and the CIA’s role in targeting and killing terrorists. 17
14

Id. at 231.
Craig Whitlock, Book Review: ‘Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution’
by Richard Whittle, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/book-review-predator-the-secret-origins-ofthe-drone-revolution-by-richard-whittle/2014/09/18/072e8fe2-385d-11e4-bdfbde4104544a37_story.html.
16
Although he concedes the usage is clunky, Whittle prefers the more accurate
nomenclature remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) to the more common unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV). Then again, “[t]he word drone is not only handy, it is an easy and elegant
way to describe any aircraft with no pilot inside.” WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at
312 (emphasis in original).
17
The distinction between drone activities properly conducted by the CIA and those more
appropriately handled by the DoD is often—and, often, inaccurately—lumped within the
larger debate of distinguishing between authorities granted in 10 U.S.C. §§ 3001-16401
(2011) (Armed Forces) and 50 USC §§ 1-2901 (2011) (War and National Defense). That
debate falls outside the scope of this brief review, but, for a comprehensive discussion of
this convoluted and often misunderstood topic written by a former senior legal advisor
for U.S. Special Operations Command Central, see Andru E. Wall, Demystifying the Title
10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert
Action, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 87–88 (2011):
15

The Title 10-Title 50 debate is the epitome of an ill-defined policy debate
with imprecise terms and mystifying pronouncements . . . , much in vogue
among national security experts and military lawyers . . . . [It] is essentially
a debate about the proper roles and missions of U.S. military forces and
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Although drones are commonly spoken of as a new technology, the concept of
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) is not new. 18 The United States saw relatively little
success using RPAs in the past, and the military was initially skeptical of Abe Karem’s
project. The turning point came when the CIA deployed one of Karem’s early prototypes
in Bosnia to take advantage of its capacity for real-time reconnaissance. 19 After
recognizing the Predator’s ability to locate targets and experiencing the difficulty of
guiding another aircraft’s pilot to the target displayed on the Predator’s camera feed, the
next logical step, as Whittle describes it, was to arm the Predator with missiles of its own.
This upgrade fundamentally changed the drone’s utility to the military and, arguably,
irrevocably altered the nature of the modern battlefield.
The Air Force primarily operates sturdy airborne weapons–delivery platforms, so
it lacked missiles that would work on the light and relatively fragile Predator. The
Army’s more diaphanous fleet of helicopters offered at least one missile light enough for
the Predator’s small motor to carry, but also powerful enough to kill a tank and smart
enough to follow a laser designator. “Its official name was the Heliborne-Launched Fireand-Forget Missile. But to those familiar with it, the missile was known by an acronym
describing what it delivered—Hellfire.” 20
Selecting the missile may have been easy, but marrying the Hellfire to the
Predator posed significant engineering and legal problems. On the legal and policy front,
a committee of government lawyers had to decide whether arming the Predator would
create a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty. 21 Things got off to a rocky start when the State Department
intelligence agencies. “Title 10” is used colloquially to refer to DoD and
military operations, while “Title 50” refers to intelligence agencies,
intelligence activities, and covert action. Concerns . . . or the “Title 10-Title
50 issues” . . . can be categorized into four broad categories: authorities,
oversight, transparency, and “rice bowls” . . . [with] transparency and “rice
bowls” . . . dismissed as policy arguments rather than legitimate legal
concerns.
For a wealth of diverse opinion and analysis, see generally DRONE WARS:
TRANSFORMING CONFLICT, LAW, AND POLICY (Peter L. Bergen & Daniel Rothenberg,
eds., 2015).
18
For a detailed account of U.S. experimentation with drones since World War I, see
Konstantin Kakaes, From Orville Wright to September 11: What the History of Drone
Technology Says About Its Future, in DRONE WARS, supra note 17, at 359–87.
19
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 70–71, 81–82. The Predator was the first
“endurance unmanned aerial vehicle,” as it was officially designated, a so-called UAV
able to fly twenty-four hours or more to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance missions. Id. at 2.
20
Id. at 172.
21
Id. at 173.
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Legal Adviser opined that the armed Predator would constitute a cruise missile. 22 The
DoD General Counsel sought to change that opinion, while, in the meantime, the Air
Force’s under-the-radar “Big Safari” operation navigated the technicalities of arming (or
“weaponizing”) the Predator without actually arming it. Big Safari accomplished this by
attaching the missile launcher to a detached wing—surely, a Predator unable to fly was
outside the legal definition of cruise missile—and wiring it to the flight control computer
in the Predator’s fuselage to check whether the systems would work together once
reconnected. 23 Fortunately, this approach was not long lived:
[G]overnment treaty experts abruptly decided that a lethal drone was
permissible under the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
The decision[] took months to reach, but the logic was simple—especially
after [National Security Council] (NSC) counterterrorism chief and armed
Predator advocate Richard Clarke weighed in. Clarke . . . pointed out that,
by definition, a cruise missile had a warhead and the Predator didn’t. The
Predator was merely a platform, an unmanned aerial vehicle that had
landing gear and was designed to return to base after a mission. 24

22

Id. at 178.
Id.
24
Id. at 183.
23
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As those initial legal issues were resolved, 25 engineers, who were largely assisted by
Hellfire experts from Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, 26 soon successfully
armed the Predator. But one monumental question remained: who would pull the trigger?
In recounting the first deployment of the Predator in Afghanistan, Whittle reveals that no
one knew the answer.
As no single agency was comfortable taking all of the responsibility, an elaborate
scheme coalesced. As summarized by Air Force lawyers, Air Force Colonel Ed Boyle’s
initial Title 10 authorization to order the actual launch of a Hellfire was contingent upon
CIA Director George Tenet’s authorization to pull the trigger. 27 Whittle provides a nailbiting account of the Predator finding Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. The
Predator trailed Omar’s convoy for hours and circled overhead while lawyers debated
whether the building Omar entered was a Mosque that risked prohibitively high collateral
damage to attack. Ultimately, the opportunity to kill Omar was squandered when a
Hellfire was shot at one of the cars in the caravan, killing an unidentified guard and
25

Even if the workaround of this discreet international legal issue is sound, broader
questions about the legality and sustainability of clandestine drone strikes remain:
A good case can be made that the use of drones to conduct targeted killings
of terrorists is legal under international law, but it is more difficult to argue
that the current program, which has apparently killed thousands of people
in multiple countries over the last decade, is consistent with more basic ruleof-law principles . . . [that] all persons, including the government itself, are
bound by laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced,
independently adjudicated, and respect individual rights. If the U.S.
government doesn’t do a better job of explaining the application of law to
the drone program, America’s stature and influence in the world could be
at risk . . . . No program, regardless of its effectiveness, can be sustained
over time if it is not accepted as lawful by the majority of nations.
Jeffrey H. Smith & John B. Bellinger III, Mr. President, We Need Rules for Drones,
POLITICO (June 26, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/dronememo-108315_full.html#.VIR1IIdjpUQ.
The practice [of targeted drone strikes] of the United States is generally
supported by international and domestic law, but there are no detailed
substantive criteria for drone use outside of hot battlefields. As such, current
U.S. drone policy provides an easy template for other empowered actors to
deploy drones for targeted killing in multiple contexts with limited
adherence to core legal principles and perhaps with even less transparency.
William Banks, Regulating Drones: Are Targeted Killings by Drones Outside Traditional
Battlefields Legal?, in DRONE WARS, supra note 17, at 155.
26
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 191.
27
Id. at 245.
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creating such a chaotic scene that none of the targets could be identified. The account
leaves the reader dispirited and disappointed in our leadership’s communication skills. 28
On the one hand, “[t]he moment was historic. The Hellfire Predator was no longer
just a concept. A new way of waging war had been inaugurated, a new way of killing
enemies proven.” 29 On the other hand, the Predator’s success was bittersweet, as Omar
escaped in large part due to miscommunication between the CIA and the military. The
episode ends with Air Force Lieutenant General Wald’s colorful exchange with the
Centcom operations director: “If you were me, what do you think I’d want to
know? . . . ‘Who the [#$%@] is running what?’” 30
As the book continues to account for the Predator’s role in the early days of U.S.
operations in Afghanistan, Whittle reveals how tweaking the trigger-pulling authority
produced different results. For example, Whittle juxtaposes the unsuccessful pursuit of
Omar against the Predator’s likely role in finding and killing Muhammad Atef. 31 In
pursuit of Atef, Combined Forces Air Component Commander Moseley did not hesitate
to level buildings. 32 Although not mentioned in Predator, it is instructive that within a
month after the unsuccessful joint CIA–Air Force operation to pursue Omar, a joint
mission between the CIA and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) resulted in
the successful raid of Omar’s compound. 33 That mission also marked the first time the
Predator provided air-to-ground fire support for a combat operation. 34 This context sheds

28

See generally id. at 245–260.
Id. at 259.
30
Id. at 260.
31
As Whittle explains, any story of Atef’s death must be taken with a grain of salt:
29

The nature and pace of military operations and the number of air strikes
U.S. forces conducted in Afghanistan during October and November 2001
likely make it impossible—especially without access to relevant classified
information that still exists—to verify any account of Atef’s death. . . . But
a number of former senior officers who were in the U.S. military chain of
command at the time, and who have never before disclosed their
recollections of this event, retain distinct and vivid memories of how they
believe Atef died—and all of them agree that the role played by the Predator
was central. What they believe about how Atef died, however, cannot be
considered proven fact, for as one explained, “We didn’t control the site,
we didn’t recover the body. . . . It’s been confirmed by the process of
elimination.”
Id. at 278–79.
32
See id. at 279–86.
33
Megan Braun, Predator Effect, in DRONE WARS, supra note 17, at 260–61.
34
Id. at 261.
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new light on CIA and DoD drone operations, which, accurately or not, have painted a
picture of laissez-faire management and oversight of firing authority. 35
Disparate results between the CIA–Air Force and CIA-JSOC operations reveal the
fallacy of viewing control over drone operations as a simple dichotomy between the CIA
and the DoD. While congressional oversight of most DoD drone operations may be more
robust than those of the CIA, moving drone operations from the CIA to the DoD may or
may not result in greater congressional oversight if JSOC ends up managing the drone
program. 36

35

A database of drone strikes collected by the New America Foundation allows for an
incredible amount of empirical analysis of drone activity:
President Barack Obama made drones one of his key national security
tools. By December 2013, he had already authorized 322 strikes in
Pakistan, six times more than the number . . . carried out during President
Bush’s entire eight years. . . . Under Obama, the drone program
accelerated from an average of one strike every forty days to one every
four days by mid-2011.
Peter L. Bergen & Jennifer Rowland, Decade of the Drone: Analyzing CIA Drone
Attacks, Casualties, and Policy, in DRONE WARS, supra note 17, at 13.
Moreover, a recent non-academic and highly accessible summary of these
tensions explained:
[A] 2012 report [generated by] a team of law students from New York
University and Stanford concluded that the dominant narrative in the U.S.
about the use of drones in Pakistan—“a surgically precise and effective
tool that makes the United States safer by enabling ‘targeted killing’ of
terrorists, with minimal downsides or collateral impacts”—is
false . . . . CIA-operated drones were nowhere near as discriminating
toward noncombatants as the agency’s leaders have claimed . . . .
[E]stimates . . . put the civilian death toll in the hundreds . . . .
The CIA’s position is that these nongovernmental counts are
much too high and have been influenced, if inadvertently, by Pakistani
government and Taliban propaganda. . . . Senator Dianne Feinstein, who
chairs the Select Committee on Intelligence, . . . said that classified
documents showed that civilian deaths caused by CIA drones each year
were “typically in the single digits.”
Steve Coll, The Unblinking Stare: The Drone War in Pakistan, NEW YORKER (Nov. 24,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare.
36
For a full discussion of this issue, see Naureen Shah, A Move Within the Shadows, in
DRONE WARS, supra note 17, at 160.
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III.

OUTSOURCING AND THE GOVERNMENT’S MONOPOLY OVER THE USE OF FORCE

Deploying a new weapons system (a good, product, or supply) 37 such as the
Predator bears little relation to the modern-era governmental outsourcing explosion 38 and
might appear unrelated to the global proliferation of arms-bearing contractors, which
tends to be dominated by the acquisition of services instead of supplies. It is wellestablished that contractors—employed by defense and civilian agencies to perform a
wide spectrum of services spanning logistics support, weapons maintenance,
transportation, interpretation, and arms-bearing security—routinely outnumbered
uniformed military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Throughout those conflicts,
government policy officials maintained that both the military and civilian agencies
respected the longstanding prohibitions against contractors performing inherently
governmental functions. 39 Yet Predator subtly reminds us how dramatically the U.S.
government has diluted the military’s longstanding monopoly over the use of force.
One of the authors of this review still chafes recalling the number of times early
in the last decade when senior Air Force and DoD officials publicly and steadfastly
denied that contractors were piloting drones and deploying weapons systems in the battle
area. 40 While the government may have preferred an alternative reality, Predator
37

48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2014) (“Supplies means all property except land or interest in
land.”); 48 C.F.R. § 37.101 (2014) (“Service contract means a contract that directly
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an
identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.”) (emphasis added); UCC §
2-105(1) (2012) (“‘Goods’ means all things . . . which are moveable at the time of
identification to the contract for sale . . . .”).
38
See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on
Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, 8 J. CONT. MGMT. 9
(2008).
39
See generally, OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REVISED
CIRCULAR NO. A-76 (May 29, 2003); Office of Federal Procurement Policy Letter 11-01,
Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56227
(September 12, 2011) (“The FAIR Act defines an activity as inherently governmental
when it is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate performance by
Federal employees.”). See also Evan Sills, Mission “Critical Function”: Improving
Outsourcing Decisions Within the Intelligence Community, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1007
(2011); Anthony LaPlaca, Note, Settling the Inherently Governmental Functions Debate
Once and for All: The Need for Comprehensive Legislation of Private Security
Contractors in Afghanistan, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 745 (2011); Mohab Tarek Khattab,
Revised Circular A-76: Embracing Flawed Methodologies, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 469
(2005); Dan Guttman, Governance by Contract: Constitutional Visions; Time for
Reflection and Choice, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 321 (2004); David M. Walker, The Future of
Competitive Sourcing, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 299 (2004); Steven L. Schooner, Competitive
Sourcing Policy: More Sail Than Rudder, 33 PUB. CONT. L. J. 263 (2004).
40
Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, Battlefield Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 393, 407, 414 (2004) (“Contractors may provide any service that is not
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suggests that the frequent, contemporaneous, secondhand anecdotes to the contrary were
credible. Whittle describes some of the complicated choreography designed to respect the
seemingly arbitrary distinctions between contractor and military action:
One of the two General Atomics pilots . . . would sit or
stand behind the military pilots, coaching them through any
tricky situations. The General Atomics pilots and the other
Air Force crews would fly the Predator on the roughly sixhour “ferry flights” necessary to get the drone to and from
its base in Uzbekistan to the skies above the Taliban
stronghold of Kandahar and other areas of interest in
southern Afghanistan. 41
Despite these intended bright-line distinctions between government and private sector
actors, Whittle describes contractor personnel both flying Predators and firing missiles: 42
Contractor pilot Big, who had taken over for Swanson,
turned the drone north for home.
As the Predator poked along, Big was instructed to
fly over Kandahar’s airport . . . . Boyle got CIA higher-ups
to approve putting the Predator’s remaining Hellfire into
the middle one of those three buildings. Getting rid of the
second missile would reduce the Predator’s aerodynamic
drag, . . . and the airfield was a valid target . . . . Guay had
given up the sensor operator’s seat to another Air Force

inherently governmental. . . . [But] DoD policy prohibits contractors from taking a direct
part in hostilities and operating in situations where international law might perceive them
as combatants. . . . It is unclear at what point a contractor employee begins to ‘engage in
hostilities.’”); Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: Introduction to the Legal Issues Associated
with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 253 (2000) (“The
military is becoming increasingly dependent on U.S. civilian contractors to support its
operations overseas. . . . [C]ertainly where a contractor’s employees each carries
automatic individual weapons or they operate crew-served weapons and where they
mirror a military organization in terms of uniforms and structure would serve to establish
a quasi-military armed force characterization.”).
41
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 246; see also id. at 253 (“Swanson and Guay,
with contractor pilot Big standing behind them, kept the Predator circling . . . .”).
42
“A contractor pilot, radio call sign ‘Big,’ was flying Predator 3038 over Afghanistan on
September 22 . . . .” Id. at 244. On a separate occasion: “Minutes after Big relieved
Ghenghis and took the controls of Predator 3037, . . . [he was cleared] to put the drone
into an orbit above Takur Ghar” to investigate a downed Chinook full of Rangers. Id. at
295–97.
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enlisted man, who after Big pulled the trigger kept the laser
designator on the structure and scored a direct hit. 43
Like many of the other significant national security policies discussed above, the
government respected the rules when convenient, but accepted Machiavellian
compromises when necessary. Granted, in an era when tens of thousands of armed
contractors populated the battle areas in Iraq and Afghanistan, the distinctions may be
dismissed as insignificant or mere niceties. But the authors of this review prefer a
government that acknowledges that difficult decisions, including ones that might breach
existing, bright-line rules, may be necessary during contingency operations.

IV.

SUCCEEDING DESPITE THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM
[R]ed tape at the Pentagon prevented the development of a
drone that could have helped avert the attacks of Sept. 11,
2001. 44

Whittle’s tale does little to instill confidence in federal government contracting,
particularly defense acquisition. One version of this story blames government
bureaucracy and acquisition inflexibility for the failure to forestall Osama Bin Laden’s
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Critical readers will dismiss this
attenuated “what if” scenario, but Predator suggests that policy leadership at the highest
levels failed to heed and react to the writing on the wall and the word on the street.
Readers may disagree about the relative advantages of the Predator. Advocates
describe drone-launched munitions “as the most discriminating aerial bombers available
in modern warfare,” while critics suggest that they “create a false impression of
exactitude.” 45 But, for better or for worse, the Predator transformed the concept of armed
43

Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
Gabriel Schoenfeld, Book Review: “Predator” by Richard Whittle, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
15, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/book-review-predator-by-richard-whittle1410822967.
45
Coll, supra note 35.
44

Last year, in a speech at the National Defense University, President
Obama acknowledged that American drones had killed civilians. He called
these incidents “heartbreaking tragedies,” which would haunt him and
those in his chain of command for “as long as we live.” But he went on to
defend drones as the most discriminating aerial bombers available in
modern warfare—preferable to piloted aircraft or cruise missiles. Jets and
missiles cannot linger to identify and avoid noncombatants before striking,
and, the President said, they are likely to cause “more civilian casualties
and more local outrage.” . . .
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drones from nascent technology to a critical tool in the war on terror. 46 Unlike most
acquisitions of cutting-edge military technology, there does not seem to be any public
uproar over cost overruns, schedule delays, or performance failures associated with
acquisition of armed drones. Just as the acquisition community should examine the root
causes of acquisition failures, we should also ask ourselves why other acquisitions
succeed.
The Predator’s success is largely due to its creators’ ability to use acquisition
loopholes designed to streamline development and production. This is not surprising, as
all too often defense acquisition succeeds despite the regulatory framework created by
lawyers and politicians, which often serves as more of an obstacle course. 47
Even the most experienced acquisition academics and professionals, however,
may be surprised to learn about the Air Force program called Big Safari, the Predator’s
driving institutional force. Big Safari was created during the Cold War to help the
military and other agencies keep an eye on the Soviet Union and spent most of its efforts
equipping aircraft with surveillance capabilities, usually very quickly and for specific
missions.48 Big Safari moves so quickly due to its rapid acquisition authority, which
But do drones actually represent a humanitarian advance in air combat? Or
do they create a false impression of exactitude?
Id. For an explanation of the tactical benefits of RPAs by a former General Counsel of
the U.S. Air Force (2009–2013), see Charles Blanchard, This Is Not War By Machine, in
DRONE WARS, supra note 17, at 118, 119 (“[T]he innovative qualities of these new
technologies are often masked by the nature of current public debate, which would
benefit from a clearer understanding of what RPAs actually do, what roles they serve, and
how they are impacting military activity and strategy.”).
46 While many assume that drones’ place in the future of modern warfare is secure, some
assert that the present demand for targeted killings is unique to the contemporary War on
Terror, and thus the Predator will not be as useful in future wars against state-actors:
The Predator has been transformational in the war on terror, but this is
largely because it was so ideally suited to the post-9/11 vision of the
CIA . . . . However, it is likely that this tactic will remain largely confined
to unconventional wars against non-state enemies . . . . [I]t is by no means
certain that this type of war will recur in the future.
Braun, Predator Effect, in DRONE WARS, supra note 17, at 277.
Whittle attributes much of this success to the Predator’s status as an ACTD (Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration) program. WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 79–
80. See generally MICHAEL R. THIRTLE, ROBERT JOHNSON & JOHN BIRKLER, THE
PREDATOR ACTD: A CASE STUDY FOR TRANSITION PLANNING TO THE FORMAL
ACQUISITION PROCESS (RAND, 1997), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR899.html.
48
WHITTLE, PREDATOR, supra note 1, at 120.
47
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allows it to bypass most of the briar patch of regulations that inhibit most defense
acquisitions:
Big Safari could get innovative gear into action within months, weeks, and
sometimes even days, rather than the years it routinely takes to develop
and field most military technology. Big Safari’s philosophy was expressed
in mottoes, catchphrases, and admonitions such as “Minimum but
adequate,” “Off-the-shelf,” “Need to know,” “Modify, don’t develop,” and
“Provide the necessary, not the nice to have.” 49
Although Congress tasked the Air Force with developing the Predator, the House
Intelligence Committee advised the Air Force that Big Safari should manage its
development, and the Air Force obliged. 50 Instead of entering into a massive research and
development contract to design a new remotely piloted aircraft, Big Safari looked at its
existing RPA, the Predator, took an accounting of what the Predator was missing, and
then checked for quick-fix solutions that either the commercial sector could provide or
the military already owned.
While we applaud the success of Big Safari in getting the Predator to the
battlefield in record time, the decision to send this project to an outfit that has authority to
work around the procurement regulations, instead of through them, signifies that the
procurement regulations are not equipped to provide the cutting-edge development
necessary to maintain battlefield superiority in the twenty-first century. The disconnect
between our military’s ability to anticipate needs and the procurement system’s ability to
satisfy those needs is made clear by one of the most sobering passages of the book:
Necessity being the mother of invention, and war being the mother of
necessity, Big Safari would soon be working to improve the Predator and
make its video much more widely available. For now, though, the drone
revolution was only dawning, and many had yet to see the light. Two
weeks before the death of Mohommad Atef, the Pentagon’s director of
operational test and evaluation, Thomas Christie, issued a report declaring
that the Predator was “not operationally effective or suitable” for
combat. 51
49

Id.
Id. at 125.
51
Id. at 293. This quote reveals a larger pathology of our Defense Acquisition System,
which we discuss in more detail in our review of Whittle’s first book. See Schooner &
Castellano, supra note 5. Instead of fixating on metrics that are easy to gather and
interpret—such as cost growth, schedule delay, and compliance with initial performance
specifications—we implore DoD to evaluate metrics that really matter, such as customer
satisfaction and the total cost of ownership. These metrics reveal the ultimate outcome of
whether DoD obtained real value for its money, as opposed to measuring compliance
with processes dictated by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) which are all too
often out of touch with consumer behavior and reality.
50
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Along the same lines, Whittle notes that the Predator flew more than 50,000 combat
hours before it officially met the requirements of IOT&E (Initial Operational Test and
Evaluation). 52 Whittle also reminds the reader that—unlike developmental aircraft (such
as the V-22) and space vehicles—the Predator’s evolution was neither stymied nor
derailed by pilot safety or accident-related fatalities. Indeed, the Predator’s greatest virtue
may be the one that makes headlines the least:
While the Predator has been used to kill for nearly fifteen years, no one
has ever died while flying a Predator or in the crash of one—neither the
manufacturer of the Predator nor its military users had to worry too much
about crashes. When a Predator goes to war and dies for its country, no
one has to knock at a family member’s front door to deliver the bad news
and no one plays Taps. In fact, more than 100 of the total of 270 Predators
built have either crashed or were shot down by the Serb or Iraqi militaries.
So General Atomics didn’t have to build in triple redundancy or make sure
the Predator’s various systems could withstand a hit from any size shell at
all . . . . 53

CONCLUSION
Predator is a terrific book, and we recommend it without reservation. Based upon
exhaustive research and an impressive interviewing campaign, evidenced by more than
300 footnotes and a fulsome bibliography, Whittle offers the reader unique access into a
community where few outsiders tread. Whittle’s insights are as informative as they are
intriguing, and the book features a surprising number of revelations, rewarding readers
with gratifying tidbits not previously available in the public domain. The book is
elegantly written, tightly edited, and the many action-packed passages rival best-selling
fiction. It is a pleasure to read.
None of this, however, makes the bottom line less troubling. As much as Predator
celebrates the initiative, creativity, ingenuity, commitment, and drive of exceptional
people, it bemoans the stifling and inefficient acquisition regime that appears to value
process over outcomes. As Congress and the recently appointed Secretary of Defense
once again contemplate defense acquisition reform, we hope that Predator becomes
mandatory reading.

52

Richard Whittle, Speech at The George Washington University Law School (Sept. 22,
2014) (transcript on file with authors).
53
Id.

